DENNIS P. RIORDAN, Esq., No. 69320
DONALD M. HORGAN, Esq., No. 121547
KAREN SNELL, Esq., No. 100266
MICHAEL S. ROMANO, Esq., No. 282182
523 Octavia Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone No. (415) 431-3472
Facsimile No. (415) 552-2703
Email: Dennis@Riordan-Horgan.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
JOHN DOE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,
Governor of California,
in his official capacity,
BILL LOCKYER,
Attorney General of California,
in his official capacity,
TOM ORLOFF,
District Attorney of Alameda County,
in his official capacity,
EDWARD S. BERBERIAN, JR.,
District Attorney of Marin County,
in his official capacity,
STEPHAN R. PASSALACQUA,
District Attorney of Sonoma County,
in his official capacity,
KAMALA D. HARRIS
District Attorney of San Francisco
County, in her official capacity,
Defendants.
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
No.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT

28 1 A complete description of JOHN DOE and his criminal history is submitted
herewith under seal.
-1-
Plaintiff JOHN DOE hereby complains against Defendants as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1.
By this Complaint, Plaintiff JOHN DOE seeks to enjoin the enforcement of
portions of a newly enacted California law on the ground that the challenged provisions
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
2.
Over 15 years ago, JOHN DOE was convicted of a non-aggravated felony offense
that requires him to register as a sex offender, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 290. Since
his conviction, JOHN DOE served his sentence, received treatment, and has led a
productive and law-abiding life. As a result, over 10 years ago, the charges against
JOHN DOE were formally “set aside” and “dismissed” by a California Superior Court.1
Nonetheless, JOHN DOE has continued to register as a sex offender, pursuant to Cal.
Penal Code § 290, et seq., as he must for the rest of his life.
3.
On November 7, 2006, California enacted “The Sexual Predator Punishment and
Control Act: Jessica’s Law” (“SPPCA”) by voter-approved initiative. Pursuant to Art. II,
sec. 10(a), of the California Constitution, the SPPCA goes into effect immediately.
4.
As a result of the SPPCA, JOHN DOE will be exiled from the home that he owns
with his wife and from the community where he has lived for over 20 years. The SPPCA
forbids any person required to register as a sex offender, including Plaintiff, from living
within 2,000 feet of a school or park where children regularly gather. As a result,

virtually every residential neighborhood in every city in California, and a vast number in
the State’s suburban areas as well, are off-limits to any person who committed a crime
requiring registration under Cal. Penal Code § 290, even those individuals who have
completed rehabilitation programs and had their criminal charges formally dismissed,
including JOHN DOE.
5.
Tens of thousands of registered sex offenders in California are affected by the
SPPCA. Unlike the sex offender residency restrictions enacted in other states, the
SPPCA does not differentiate between people convicted of violent crimes such as rape
people who pose a continuing threat to the community, and those who committed less
violent crimes and pose no continuing threat on the other. California treats everyone like
the worst offender.
6.
Keeping California’s children safe from sex crimes is a legitimate and important
public interest. But there is no evidence that the SPPCA residency restrictions will
accomplish this goal. To the contrary, criminological analysis and anecdotal evidence
from law enforcement in other states demonstrate that sex offender residency restrictions,
such as those in the SPPCA, do nothing to decrease sex offender recidivism.
7.
Because further disclosure of JOHN DOE’s identity is unnecessary
and would be unduly prejudicial, JOHN DOE proceeds in this Complaint under a
pseudonym, pursuant to Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2001), reversed on
other grounds, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
8.
Plaintiff JOHN DOE resides in the Northern District of California within 2,000
feet of a school or park where children regularly gather.

Defendant ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER is the Governor of the State of
California and is sued in his official capacity.
10.
Defendant BILL LOCKYER is the Attorney General of the State of
California and is sued in his official capacity.
11.
Defendant TOM ORLOFF is the District Attorney of Alameda County,
California, and is sued in his official capacity.
12.
Defendant EDWARD S. BERBERIAN, JR. is the District Attorney of Marin
County, California, and is sued in his official capacity.
13.
Defendant STEPHAN R. PASSALACQUA is the District Attorney of Sonoma
County, California, and is sued in his official capacity.
14.
Defendant KAMALA D. HARRIS is the District Attorney of San Francisco
County, California, and is sued in her official capacity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
15.
JOHN DOE resides within the Northern District of California. This Complaint
alleges violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution and seeks prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Venue is properly located with
this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

FACTS GIVING RISE TO THIS COMPLAINT
JOHN DOE’S RESIDENCE
16.
JOHN DOE resides within 2,000 feet of a school or park where children regularly
gather. As a result of the residency restriction in the SPPCA, which amended Cal. Penal
Code § 3003.5(b) and (c), JOHN DOE is prohibited from residing in the home that he
owns with his wife and in his community of over 20 years. JOHN DOE must sell his
property and relocate himself, his family and his business. Because JOHN DOE is
prohibited by the SPPCA from living in almost every home in the county that he
currently resides, he has effectively been banished from his community.
17.
JOHN DOE’s current residence is located within the jurisdiction of one of the
district attorneys named as defendants. If forced to move in order to comply with the
SPPCA, he will seek to relocate within his current county of residence or within the
counties of the other district attorneys named as defendants.
PLEA AGREEMENT
18.
JOHN DOE was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement with the People of the
State of California in which he pled nolo contendere to a single count of a nonaggravated
felony. JOHN DOE agreed to forego a trial and admitted to factual
allegations against him. Pursuant to the plea document, it was agreed that the “possible
sentence(s) which could be imposed as a result of [JOHN DOE’s] plea[]” was
commitment in state prison for a certain maximum term and mandatory registration as a
sex offender, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 290. In return for JOHN DOE’s plea, the
State agreed to drop two charges against him and not to seek any sentencing
enhancements. JOHN DOE entered this agreement with the understanding that he would
be forced to abide by Cal. Penal Code § 290, as it then existed.

After accepting the plea agreement, a Superior Court Judge sentenced JOHN
DOE. Thereafter, JOHN DOE served his sentence and successfully completed his term
of supervised probation. He has been a successful and contributing member of his
community ever since.
DISMISSAL OF CHARGES
20.
Over 10 years ago, JOHN DOE moved for his plea to be “set aside” pursuant to
Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4. The California Superior Court granted his motion, ordering
that a not guilty plea be entered in place of JOHN DOE’s original plea and that the
government’s accusatory pleading against JOHN DOE be “dismissed.”
21.
JOHN DOE remained in California and continued to live an honest and upright
life with sobriety and industry obeying the laws of the land. As a result, based on the law
at the time of his plea, JOHN DOE would have qualified for a Certificate of
Rehabilitation and would have been relieved of the burden of registering as a sex
offender long before the SPPCA was enacted.
1996 LEGISLATION
22.
On July 7, 1996, the then-governor of California signed into law Assembly Bill
1901, amending Cal. Penal Code § 290.5, effective immediately. The new law revoked
the benefit of a Certificate of Rehabilitation for individuals convicted of specified crimes,
including the offense committed by JOHN DOE.
1997 LEGISLATION
23.
On July 14, 1997, the then-governor of California signed into law Assembly Bill
729, adding subsection (d) to Cal. Penal Code § 4852.01, effective January 1, 1998. This
amendment precludes individuals who are or were at any time in the past convicted of

violating specified crimes, including JOHN DOE, from applying for a Certificate of
Rehabilitation.
2004 LEGISLATION
24.
On September 24, 2004, Defendant Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law
Assembly Bill 488, enacting Cal. Penal Code § 290.46 (“Megan’s Law”), effective
immediately. Cal. Penal Code § 290.46 directs the California Department of Justice to
establish and maintain an Internet Web site accessible to the public for distributing
information concerning people convicted of specified offenses, including Cal. Penal
Code § 288(a). The Web site is to include the person’s name, date of birth, home
address, physical description, gender, race, photograph, record of conviction, “and any
other information that the Department of Justice deems relevant,” with certain
exceptions.
2006 LEGISLATION
25.
On November 7, 2006, voters approved Proposition 83, enacting the SPPCA.
Among other things, the SPPCA amended Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5, adding subsections
(a) through (c). Subsections (b) and (c) are relevant here:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is
unlawful for any person for whom registration is required
pursuant to Section 290 to reside within 2000 feet of any
public or private school, or park where children regularly
gather.
(c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit municipal
jurisdictions from enacting local ordinances that further
restrict the residency of any person for whom registration is
required pursuant to Section 290.
26.
The legislative intent in enacting the SPPCA was retributive and punitive.
According to the SPPCA, its intent is to satisfy Californians’ desire to “deter and punish
criminal behavior,” and to “take additional steps to monitor sex offenders, to protect the
public from them, and to provide adequate penalties for and safeguards against sex

offenders, particularly those who prey on children.”
27.
The practical effect of the SPPCA on JOHN DOE is also clearly punitive. The
residency restriction in the SPPCA effectively banishes JOHN DOE from his home and
community for a crime he committed, and paid his debt for, long ago. The SPPCA
imposes affirmative disabilities and restraints on JOHN DOE by forcing him from the
home that he owns with his wife and his community of over 20 years. It interferes with
his right to work, his right to privacy, and his right to travel freely, creating a severe
personal, financial, and professional burden on JOHN DOE and his family.
28.
The SPPCA also applies to JOHN DOE without any determination that he poses
any threat to public safety. It removes him from his residence without an opportunity to
demonstrate that there is no rational relationship between the putative purpose of the
SPPCA and his ouster from his community. Indeed, as a result of earlier legislation, i.e.
Cal. Penal Code § 4852.01(d), JOHN DOE is prevented from establishing his lack of
dangerousness.
29.
In addition, the SPPCA violates the terms of JOHN DOE’s plea agreement by
increasing the maximum penalty to which he could be, and now is, subjected.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
I. THE RESIDENCY RESTRICTION IN THE SPPCA VIOLATES
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
30.
JOHN DOE hereby re-alleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs into this
first cause of action and alleges further:

The residency restriction enacted in the SPPCA, amending Penal Code § 3003.5,
was enacted after JOHN DOE committed his crime, was convicted, and served his
sentence. Because JOHN DOE is “[a] person for whom registration is required pursuant
to Section 290,” the residency restriction applies retroactively to him. Because JOHN
DOE resides within 2,000 feet of a school or park where children regularly gather, he
will be committing an unlawful act by living in his own home if the SPPCA is permitted
to remain in effect.
32.
The SPPCA was enacted with retributive and punitive legislative intent. Even if
the legislative intent in enacting the SPPCA is not readily apparent, the effect of the
SPPCA is clearly punitive. The SPPCA banishes JOHN DOE from his home and
community.
33.
Because the SPPCA applies retroactively to JOHN DOE and because its
provisions were passed with the legislative intent, and practical effect, to further punish
individuals, including JOHN DOE, for past crimes, the SPPCA application violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
II. THE SPPCA VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BY BREACHING THE
TERMS OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT
34.
JOHN DOE hereby re-alleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs into this
second cause of action and alleges further:
35.
At the time of JOHN DOE’s plea, operation of Cal. Penal Code § 290 did not
include any residency restriction. In addition, at the time of JOHN DOE’s conviction,
the registration requirements provided under Cal. Penal Code § 290 were not imposed on
individuals who received a Certificate of Rehabilitation.

The changes to California’s sex offender registration scheme enacted after JOHN
DOE’s plea agreement was accepted violate the terms of this agreement by increasing the
penalty he must serve as a result of his conviction. Continued enforcement of these
changes in law—including the residency restriction of the SPPCA and ineligibility for an
effective certificate of rehabilitation—violates the terms of JOHN DOE’s plea agreement
and his rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
III. THE SPPCA VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BY DEPRIVING JOHN
DOE OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS WITHOUT A
NOTICE OR AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
37.
JOHN DOE hereby re-alleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs into this
third cause of action and alleges further:
38.
JOHN DOE has constitutionally protected liberty and property interests in
residing in his home and community of 20 years. The SPPCA imposes substantial
restrictions on the liberty and property interests of JOHN DOE because it forces him to
move from his existing home without notice or a hearing and severely limits his choice of
future residences. The SPPCA effectively establishes a conclusive and unconstitutional
presumption that every person required to register under Cal. Penal Code § 290 is
sufficiently likely to cause harm to children that each of them must be subjected to the
onerous residential restrictions mandated the SPPCA.
39.
Because the SPPCA goes into effect immediately, the SPPCA forces JOHN DOE
to move from his home and community overnight. JOHN DOE will commit a crime by
living in his own home without any determination that he is a threat to his community.
Such restrictions on JOHN DOE’s liberty and property interests can be justified, if at all,
only based on individual determination that maintaining his current residence poses a

likelihood of potential harm to children.
40.
The SPPCA provides no process to establish that JOHN DOE is a threat to his
community. The SPPCA infringes on JOHN DOE’s liberty and property interests by
evicting him from his home and community without any determination that there is any
rational relationship between the purported objective of the SPPCA and removing JOHN
DOE from his home.
41.
Because the SPPCA deprives JOHN DOE of liberty and property interests based
on an irrebuttable presumption without notice, hearing, or due process of law, it violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
In light of the violations of his constitutional rights, JOHN DOE seeks the
following relief:
(1) A temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent
injunction, restraining enforcement of the residency restrictions enacted in the SPPCA.
(2) An order providing for specific performance of JOHN DOE’s plea
agreement, including enforcement of the penalties and obligations that the parties agreed
to at the time of the plea.
(3) A declaratory judgement that the newly enacted residency restrictions in
the SPPCA, i.e. (new) Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5, are unconstitutional on their face and as
applied to JOHN DOE.
(4) Attorneys fees and costs.
(5) Any other relief deemed appropriate by this Court.

Dated: Respectfully Submitted
Dennis P. Riordan
Donald M. Horgan
Karen Snell
Michael S. Romano
RIORDAN & HORGAN
By _______________________
Dennis P. Riordan
Counsel for Plaintiff

VERIFICATION
I, DENNIS P. RIORDAN, hereby declare as follows:
I am lead counsel for Plaintiff. I declare the foregoing Complaint to be true and
correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
Executed, on November __, 2006 in San Francisco, California.
_______________________
DENNIS P. RIORDAN
Counsel for Plaintiff JOHN DOE

CERTIFICATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-16, the undersigned certifies that as of this date,
other than the named parties, there is no such interest to report.
Executed, on November __, 2006 in San Francisco, California.
_______________________
DENNIS P. RIORDAN
Counsel for Plaintiff JOHN DOE